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1 Introduction
The current corporate tax principle in the European single market is characterized by a
separate taxation of profits of each foreign subsidiary (separate accounting). This main
principle in addition with different national statutory corporate tax rates in the Euro-
pean Union (EU) thus provides multinational enterprises (MNEs) with the opportunity
to shift profits from high–tax to low–tax countries. The incentive to relocate corporate
income could be even larger for European MNEs compared to US–based multinationals,
as tax differences in Europe can be large even among neighboring states and, addition-
ally, as most EU countries employ the exemption system for taxing foreign corporate
profits, under which international tax differentials in the source country of the invest-
ment are directly relevant for the after–tax profits of companies.1 It is therefore of
fundamental importance for governments in EU high–tax countries to protect their na-
tional corporate tax revenue against various kinds of profit shifting.2 However, the tax
auditing of the MNEs’ transfer pricing documentations constitutes substantial costs
for governments and, furthermore, in many cases it is unfeasible to reveal all potential
shifting activities of a MNE. The current proposal of the European Commission (2001)
aims to eliminate or at least substantially reduce these tax avoidance incentives by con-
solidating all corporate tax bases of a MNE and reallocating this profit to the different
subsidiary locations according to a specific formula (formula apportionment). Fuest
(2008) gives a comprehensive review on the current state of the European Commis-
sions renewed proposal for a directive on the introduction of a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), which is supposed to be submitted at the end of 2008.3
With respect to this proposed changeover to a EU corporate tax system of formula
apportionment, it is of fundamental importance to evaluate the actual magnitude of
profit shifting in the EU under the current principle of separate accounting. A high di-
mension of multinational income shifting activities would give one strong argument for
1The system of foreign tax credit applied in the US aims to equalize international differences in
corporate tax rates through compensating supplementary taxation of foreign source income in the
parent country. This should induce fewer incentives to shift profits, other things being equal.
2Basically, three methods of shifting profits can be distinguished. First, charging intra–company
intermediate goods for a higher or a lower than the arm’s length price (transfer pricing). Second,
overhead costs, e.g. for R&D or headquarter services, can be allocated strategically to subsidiaries in
different countries in order to bias their pre–tax profits. Third, MNEs can shift profits via the channel
of intercompany financial transactions, for instance by granting advantageous interest rates for loans.
3See European Commission (2008) for a recent working paper by the Commissions working group
which presents and discusses possible parts of the final proposal.
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the transition to formula apportionment. This paper estimates the intensity of profit
shifting behavior in the EU and thus can contribute to this decision making problem;
particularly, as empirical studies on profit shifting with European data are still scarce.
Hence, our results could help to assess the level of the bias in national corporate tax
bases in the EU that results from the relocation of profits. We analyze this issue using
a broad European micro data set in a panel structure (AMADEUS database) which
thus allows the application of the fixed–effects method. While controlling for unobserv-
able time–constant heterogeneity between affiliates, we explain variations in affiliate’s
pre–tax profits with various firm and country characteristics and additionally with the
statutory corporate tax rate differential to the parent firm. This tax measure captures
the direct profit shifting incentive. Our baseline sample consists of 67, 804 observations
from 14, 077 multinational subsidiaries within the EU–25 for the years 1995 to 2005.
Our results show a robust inverse relationship between the statutory tax rate of a sub-
sidiary relative to the parent firm location and the subsidiary’s unconsolidated pre–tax
profitability which can be interpreted as indirect evidence of profit shifting. Quanti-
tatively, we find a semi–elasticity of −.71, meaning that a decrease in a subsidiary’s
statutory tax rate difference to its parent by 10 percentage points increases the sub-
sidiary’s pre–tax profitability by 7.1%, other things being equal. Various robustness
tests support this profit shifting inference.
In addition, we provide evidence that a higher parent’s ownership share of a sub-
sidiary leads to an increase in the level of profit shifted between these two affiliates,
and vice versa. Theoretically, the ownership share is highly relevant for a MNE’s profit
shifting activities as it directly affects the feasibility of implementing tax planning
strategies and thus determines the shifting cost. For example, an increase in the par-
ent’s ownership share can lead to a boost in shifting activities via an eased enforceability
of tax strategies due to more management influence at the subsidiary in general, or
more share voting rights in particular, as opposed management interests from other
parties involved are now reduced (management effect). Robust empirical evidence for
this positive impact of the ownership share on the intensity of profit shifting is scarce in
the existing literature. However, on the outbound side of German FDI, Weichenrieder
(2008) finds some evidence of the ownership share impact on profit shifting behavior
comparing tax rate effects for affiliates that are wholly owned vs. non–wholly owned.
Our continuous ownership effect strengthen this result of Weichenrieder (2008) by pro-
viding evidence that changes in the tax differential yield a stronger effect on pre–tax
profitability for multinational subsidiaries that are owned by their foreign parent with
a higher ownership share.
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The existing empirical literature on profit shifting focuses mainly on US data (see
Hines, 1997, Hines, 1999, and Devereux, 2006, for comprehensive surveys). Most studies
provide indirect evidence as data on intra–firm transactions is limited even in the US.4
In doing so, the standard method used in this literature tries to explain differences in
(unconsolidated) pre–tax profits of affiliated companies by the statutory corporate tax
rate which is effective at the affiliate’s location, while controlling for firm and country
characteristics. Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994), for example,
perform this with aggregate data on affiliates by country, whereas e.g. Collins et al.
(1998) as well as Harris et al. (1993), with a similar methodology, use firm–level data.
A more precise explanatory tax measure is however, to describe the incentive of a MNE
to shift profits between two affiliates with the bilateral statutory tax rate difference of
an affiliated multinational corporation to its foreign parent firm. In our paper, we use
this tax differential for the identification of shifting activities.
Evidence of profit shifting with European data is still rare. Weichenrieder (2008)
confirms profit shifting into and out of Germany with German panel FDI–data (MiDi
database), using statutory tax rates and after–tax profits as identification. With the
same database, Overesch (2006) demonstrates for German MNEs a negative impact of
the statutory tax rate on the size of balance sheet items that reflect intra–company
sales. Huizinga and Laeven (2008), with a methodology close to Hines and Rice (1994),
perform a cross–section analysis for the year 1999 with affiliate level data from the
AMADEUS database to provide evidence of profit shifting within European MNEs
by explaining variations in Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) with various
tax differentials, among firm and country controls. We use the same micro database as
Huizinga and Laeven (2008), but undertake a panel analysis over 11 years controlling for
fixed firm effects. This method can alleviate the endogeneity problem of unobservable
firm–specific characteristics in explaining variations in profits. A firm’s profitability is
likely to be driven by internal firm–specific factors, which are impossible to control
for by variables available in standard accounting databases (e.g. management quality,
degree of product innovation, product popularity, etc.). Therefore, to analyze firm
behavior issues, using panel data in combination with the fixed–effects estimation model
should lead to more reliable and robust results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a simple model of
profit shifting is presented. From this model, we derive the hypotheses for our econo-
metric specifications. Section 3 describes the data and the sample composition. Section
4So far, only a few papers yield direct evidence of profit shifting by using affiliate level data on
intra–company transfer prices (Swenson, 2001, Clausing, 2003, and Bernard et al., 2006).
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4 presents the estimation approach, the empirical results and various robustness checks.
Section 5 concludes.
2 A simple model of profit shifting
We set up a simple and well–established theoretical model of profit shifting. For this
purpose, we relate for instance to Grubert (2003) but incorporate a parameter for the
ownership share, as first introduced by Weichenrieder (2008). This model serves to
derive our testable hypotheses for the empirical analysis of section 4.
We assume a MNE with some degree of market power and with one foreign subsidiary.
The parent firm, subscripted with p, has to bear the statutory corporate tax rate
0 ≤ tp < 1, the subsidiary, subscripted with s, has to bear 0 ≤ ts < 1. The two affiliates
engage in exogenous intra–company, i.e. inter–affiliate, transactions T > 0, that is they
purchase and sell a given amount of intermediate products or intra–company services.
This provides the MNE with the opportunity to shift profits by deviating from the
arm’s length price for these intra–company sales.
Profit shifting is modeled through the shifting parameter s which represents the
amount of profit shifted per transaction. If tp > ts, profits are shifted from the parent
to the subsidiary, i.e. s > 0, and a higher s means more shifting. The opposite results
for a reversed tax scenario. The parameter ρ > 0 represents all expected costs of shift-
ing, including the probability of detection, the penalty, potential image loss, costs of
distorted management incentives, etc.
The parameter 0 < δ ≤ 1 denotes the parent’s ownership share of its subsidiary,
with δ = 1 indicating a wholly owned affiliate. We incorporate a major effect that the
parent’s ownership share of its foreign subsidiary can have on the level of profits shifted
from or to this affiliate. A lower ownership share results in a limited enforceability
of profit shifting strategies due to more potentially opposed management interests
from other parties involved, and vice versa. We call this the management effect of the
ownership share on the shifting intensity and model this effect by an increase in the
costs of shifting if the ownership share declines, and vice versa.
The output of the parent, Fp(Kp, Lp), is produced with mobile capital and immobile
labor with cost r and wp, respectively. We assume no depreciation of capital. The
deductibility of the tax penalty is fully embodied in ρ. Hence, the after–tax profit of
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the parent is given by
pinetp = (1− tp) [Fp(Kp, Lp)− rKp − wpLp − s T ]
− (ρ/2)(s/δ)2 T (1)
The last term gives a quadratic specification of the expected shifting costs function
which is frequently used in the literature. We also assume that these costs are solely
borne by the parent.5 The respective after–tax profit of the subsidiary is
pinets = (1− ts) [Fs(Ks, Ls)− rKs − wsLs + s T ] (2)
Summing up these two affiliates’ profits yields the overall after–tax profit of the MNE:6
Πnet = (1− tp) [Fp(Kp, Lp)− rKp − wpLp]
+ (1− ts) [Fs(Ks, Ls)− rKs − wsLs]
+ (tp − ts)s T − (ρ/2)(s/δ)2 T (3)
The shifting term (first term in the last row of Eq. (3)) reflects the tax gain from
shifting profits (before penalties). Maximizing overall net profits of the MNE holding
all input factors fixed yields the optimal level of shifting
s∗ =
(tp − ts) δ 2
ρ
(4)
Thus, in the optimum, s∗ > 0 if tp > ts, i.e. the MNE shifts profits from the parent to
the subsidiary. Vice versa, s∗ < 0 if tp < ts and profits are shifted to the parent. The
optimal level of shifting has the following comparative static properties:
∂s∗
∂(tp − ts) > 0 (5)
∂s∗
∂δ
=
(tp − ts) 2 δ
ρ
> 0 if tp > ts
< 0 if tp < ts (6)
5We do not assume any effect of the ownership share on the probability of detection, i.e. we expect
that a parent with a partly owned affiliate (e.g. 51% of the shares) is treated equal by the tax authority
as if the affiliate is wholly owned (same intensity of investigation).
6We do not model the relevance of the ownership share for the overall profit of the MNE, i.e. we
do not incorporate the effect, that a lower ownership share gives the incentive to shift profits from
the partly owned affiliate to the (wholly owned) parent and vice versa, as this ownership effect is
independent of tax differences between these two affiliates. In our analysis, we want to focus on profit
shifting resulting solely from tax differentials. See Grubert (2003) for a similar procedure.
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The optimal level of shifting increases with the tax differential (and decreases with the
expected cost of shifting parameter ρ). A rise in the ownership share δ increases the
optimal level of shifting s∗ via the management effect, independent of the direction of
shifting. We test this hypothesis from Eq. (6) empirically in section 4.4. If tp > ts,
profits are shifted to the subsidiary and, thus, s∗ > 0. Hence, an increase in δ leads to
a higher level of shifting. The same results if tp < ts, as profits are shifted to the parent
and s∗ < 0.
Holding again all inputs fixed, we get our main theoretical hypothesis which will be
tested throughout our econometric analysis to identify profit shifting:
∂pigrossp
∂(tp − ts) =
(
∂pigrossp
∂s∗
)(
∂s∗
∂(tp − ts)
)
= −T (1 + tp − ts)
(
∂s∗
∂(tp − ts)
)
< 0 (7)
In the tax scenario tp > ts (tax scenario tp < ts), a rise (decline, i.e. getting more
negative) in the tax differential results in a higher level of shifting and yields a decrease
(increase) in the gross profit of the parent (and finally, a rise in the overall net profit
of the MNE). In addition, a rise in the ownership share δ leads to intensified shifting
(Eq. (6)) which further reduces (increases) the pre–tax profit of the parent.
Summarized, the simple model results in the following propositions which constitute
the theoretical basis of our empirical analysis in section 4.
Proposition 1.
A larger tax difference of the two affiliates leads to a higher optimal level of profit shift-
ing. This reduces the pre–tax profit of the ’high–tax affiliate’ and, vice versa, increases
the pre–tax profit of the ’low–tax affiliate’.
Proposition 2.
A rise in the parent’s ownership share of its subsidiary leads to a higher optimal level
of profit shifting.
3 Data
We employ the European micro database AMADEUS provided by Bureau van Dijk
which contains standardized unconsolidated and/or consolidated annual accounts for
up to 1.5 million national and multinational, public and privat companies in 38 Euro-
pean countries from 1993 to 2006. The database involves detailed descriptive informa-
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tion, numerous balance sheet and profit & loss account items as well as information on
the ownership structure, but is unbalanced in structure.
There is no legal commitment for firms to give out information for the database.
However, usually the real source of the AMADEUS data is Creditreform. The purpose
of this institution7 insures a strong incentive for firms to participate and additionally
insures an adequate quality of the data. As in reality the calculation of arm’s length
prices for transfer pricing auditing by national tax authorities is difficult, time intensive
or even unfeasible, e.g. in case of specific patents, other methods are usually applied.
Mostly, this is the so called Transaction Based Net Margin Method, which compares
the net profit margin of the respective affiliate with similar but non–affiliated firms
of the same branch with the help of a database. For this, both sides, transfer pricing
consultants (e.g. Deloitte and KPMG) as well as more and more tax authorities (e.g.
in Germany and France), use the AMADEUS database.8
Our sample contains firms from all EU–25 member states despite Cyprus and Malta
(EU–23 in the remainder) for the time period of 1995–2005. These countries and years
are sufficiently represented by the database. The country statistics are presented in Ta-
ble 1 in the Appendix. Furthermore, our analysis accounts only for non–public and for
industrial MNEs. The observational units of our analysis are multinational subsidiaries.
Thereby, we consider a subsidiary to be multinational if there exists a corporate im-
mediate shareholder with totally at least 90% of the ownership shares, i.e. the parent
firm, which is located in a foreign country worldwide.9 Finally, our baseline regression
consists of 67, 804 observations from 14, 077 multinational subsidiaries; hence, we ob-
serve each subsidiary for 4.8 years on average.10 Moreover, 30.5% of the subsidiaries in
7Creditreform International traces active commercial enterprises worldwide and checks their cred-
itworthiness to provide credit reports and debt collection services to creditors.
8However, firms can self–select into the database or stay out. But by assuming that (more intrans-
parent) firms which refuse the inclusion in the database are more willing to engage in (illegal) profit
shifting activities, our estimation results should be biased downwards. Thus, with possibly underesti-
mated but significant coefficient estimates, profit shifting inference is still feasible.
9The data restriction to subsidiaries which are owned by 90% or more ensures that the potential
relocation of profit to this affiliate is actually relevant for the MNE. We analyze the effect of the
parent’s ownership share on the shifting intensity in section 4.4.
10For our econometric specification (explained in detail in the next section), we need the balance
sheet items calculated in unconsolidated form. In addition, we have restricted the export from the
AMADEUS database to MNEs that are currently active. Finally, this baseline sample consists of
22, 991 relevant firms. Note, that no financial corporations are included in AMADEUS, and that only
profitable subsidiaries are considered in our regressions. Furthermore, we drop the few observations
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our sample are owned by a parent that is located outside of the EU–23, thus, for 69.5%
of the cases there exists an immediate shareholder within the EU–23.
The AMADEUS data has the drawback that information on the ownership structure
is available for the last reported date only which is the year 2004 in most cases of our
database version. Therefore, in the context of our panel study, there exists some scope
for misclassifications of parent–subsidiary–connections since the ownership structure
may have changed over the sample period.11 However, in line with previous studies, we
are not too concerned about this issue since potential misclassifications would introduce
noise to our estimations that would (again) bias our results towards zero (see e.g. Budd
et al., 2005). In addition, in subsection 4.3.1, we regress our data for the cross–section
of the year 2004 as a qualitative robustness check.
[Table 2 here]
The descriptive sample statistics are shown in Table 2. The mean of profit before
taxation is calculated with 7.4 million US dollars. On average, a subsidiary holds fixed
assets amounting to 41.9 million US dollars, observes yearly cost of employees of 9.5
million US dollars and employs 211 workers. Furthermore, the mean of a subsidiary’s
operating revenue amounts to 93.4 million US dollars, and the average subsidiary has
62.3% of its total assets financed through borrowing.
We merge data on the statutory corporate tax rate (including local taxes) at the
subsidiary and parent location, as well as basic country characteristics like GDP, GDP
per capita, the unemployment rate, and a corruption index.12 On the subsidiary level,
the statutory tax rate spreads from 10.0% to 56.8% with a mean of 33.4%, whereas, on
the parent level, the tax rate spreads from 0% to 56.8% with a mean of 35.2%. Our main
tax measure, the Tax Difference to Parent, is defined as the statutory corporate tax
rate of a subsidiary minus the tax rate of the parent. This tax differential spreads from
that exhibit implausible variable values, i.e. negative assets, cost or sales, or leverage ratios of less
than 0 or greater than 1.
11However, we have compared our 2004 ownership data with that of the year 1998 and found that
for 87% of our subsidiaries the country of the parent firm is the same for both years.
12The statutory tax rates are taken from the European Commission (2006). Data on GDP comes
from the IMF. Data on GDP per capita (in Purchasing Power Standards, EU–25 = 100) and on the
unemployment rate is from the European Statistical Office (Eurostat). The corruption index (Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index, CPI) is taken from Transparency International and ranks from 0 (extrem level
of corruption) to 10 (free of corruption).
9
−46.8% to 43.2% with a mean of −1.8% and a standard deviation of 8.9 percentage
points.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section, we first describe the econometric methodology to test Propositions 1
and 2 from section 2. Then, subsection 4.2 presents our baseline estimation results. In
subsection 4.3, two fundamental robustness checks are undertaken. Finally, in subsec-
tion 4.4, the influence of the parent’s ownership share on the level of profit shifting is
empirically analyzed.
4.1 Methodology
Our specification to identify profit shifting activities is the regression of the unconsol-
idated pre–tax profitability13 of a profit–making multinational subsidiary on various
firm and country characteristics and on the statutory corporate tax rate difference to
its parent firm, controlling for fixed firm and year effects.14 Taking tax differentials is
a more precise procedure in capturing the extent of the profit shifting incentive for a
multinational affiliate than working with single tax rates. Quantitative interpretations
of purely tax rate coefficients have to be taken with care. Calculated tax rate effects on
pre–tax profits might not be confined solely to profit shifting activities, as the incentive
to invest in a given country also decreases with the corporate tax rate.15
Based on our main hypothesis from Eq. (7) of the theoretical model16, the estimation
13Pre–tax profits are taken form the balance sheet item Profit (Loss) before Taxation which is net
of all cost but before taxation.
14Note that 69% of our observational units own no further subsidiaries and 22% own solely domestic
subsidiaries. Therefore, the vast majority of the subsidiary in the sample cannot engage in (downward)
profit shifting activities with own foreign subsidiaries and, thus, the tax rate difference to the parent
is an appropriate measure of the overall (upward) shifting incentive of our observational units.
15By constructing the tax differential, the statutory tax rate is the relevant tax measure for an
analysis of profit shifting activities, in contrast to the effective (average or marginal) tax rate (see e.g.
Devereux (2006) for an extensive commentary). Furthermore, a MNE can define its own tax base by
the shifting of profits. Thus, using effective tax rates instead of statutory rates would be misleading
in this application.
16Note, to confer the theoretical model on our empirical specification, the status of the parent and
of the subsidiary have to switch. Hence, from the perspective of the subsidiary, the cost of shifting
term is irrelevant which further simplifies the derivative in Eq. (7).
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equation takes on the following form
Log(PBTijt) = β0 + β1Xit + β2Yjt + γDIFFSTRit + zi + vj + ρt + ijt (8)
with subscript i denoting the observational unit, i.e. a multinational subsidiary. Sub-
script j indicates the macro level, i.e. a member state of the EU–23, and t denotes the
time period (year). The dependent variable PBTijt is the profit before taxation of a
subsidiary. Xit stands for a vector of firm characteristics. These control variables on
the micro level are the subsidiary’s fixed assets as a proxy for the installed capital, the
cost of employees as a proxy for the use of labor, and the financial leverage ratio (see
e.g. Huizinga and Laeven, 2008, for a similar application of micro controls).17 All firm
variables are calculated per employee to control for subsidiary size and to get a compa-
rable profitability measure which is, however, neither qualitatively nor quantitatively
decisive for our results. All variables besides the tax variables and the leverage ratio
are transformed in logarithmic form to mitigate the potential effect of outliers.
Yjt is a vector of time–varying country characteristics. These control variables on the
macro level are GDP (as a proxy for the market size), GDP per capita (as a proxy
for the degree of development), the unemployment rate (as a proxy for the economic
situation), and an index for the degree of corruption (as a proxy for the overall risk of a
country). The variables will also enter in logarithmic form which is again not crucial for
our results. The explanatory variable of central interest is DIFFSTRit which stands
for our main tax measure, i.e. the statutory tax rate difference of affiliate i to its foreign
parent in year t. As this differential is calculated by subtracting the parent tax rate
from the subsidiary tax rate, we expect γ to have a significantly negative sign to get
(indirect) evidence of profit shifting. zi and vj represent unobserved characteristics on
the firm level and on the country level, respectively. The error term is denoted by ijt.
In the baseline panel regressions, we include year dummy variables ρt to control for
shocks over time common to all affiliates. Instead, in the cross–section regressions of
the robustness checks, we are able to additionally include (time–constant) industry
dummies and, when leaving out the macro control variables, country dummies.
The panel structure of our sample allows the application of fixed–effects methods on
17In line with previous studies, we are not too concerned about potential endogeneity problems
with these firm regressors as we apply them as control variables whose inclusion does not affect the
coefficient estimate of our tax differential, i.e. we yield qualitatively equal and quantitatively very
similar tax effects in our regressions if we completely leave out these micro controls. Additionally, as
a robustness check, we alternatively apply the number of employees instead of the cost of employees
as a proxy for the labor input (cf. section 4.3). Again, we find no change in any of our qualitative and
quantitative results.
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the micro level. This considerably alleviates the endogeneity problem of unobservable,
time–constant firm–specific factors zi in explaining variations in profits, e.g. manage-
ment quality or product popularity. The fixed–effects model is also preferred to a
random–effects approach as suggested by a Hausman–Test. Potentially unobserved,
time–constant country characteristics vj are controlled for by the included fixed firm
effects because together the firm–specific fixed effects of all affiliates in one country
perfectly account also for all unobservable macro factors. Thus, we estimate Eq. (8)
with our panel data by OLS with subsidiary fixed effects.
Huizinga and Laeven (2008) likewise use the AMADEUS database but undertake a
cross–section analysis of the year 1999 without the possibility to control for fixed effects.
In addition, compared to Huizinga and Laeven (2008), as dependent variable we use
the balance sheet item Profit (Loss) before Taxation. Employing EBIT, which includes
interest payments, as dependent variable could blur the effect of the tax differential as
these payments can also serve as a profit shifting channel.
To analyze the effect of the parent’s ownership share of its subsidiary on the shift-
ing intensity between these two affiliates, in a cross–section analysis of the year 2004
in section 4.4, we interact DIFFSTRi2004 with the parent’s ownership share of the
considered subsidiary i in 2004.18 For this, in section 4.4, we will relax our initial sam-
ple requirement of the parent’s minimum ownership share of 90% to 25%. Finally, we
expect this interaction term to exhibit a negative coefficient estimate indicating an
additional negative impact of the tax differential on pre–tax profitability for a higher
ownership share, holding the tax differential fixed.
4.2 Baseline estimation results
Our baseline results are shown in Table 3. We run panel estimations for the years
1995–2005 and for up to 14, 077 subsidiaries applying OLS with fixed–effects. With at
maximum 67, 804 observations, the regressions thus comprise on average 4.8 observa-
tions per affiliate. All estimations include year dummy variables and heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters, which are displayed in the tables in
parentheses.
Throughout all specifications of Table 3, the coefficient estimates of our firm controls,
the fixed assets and the cost of employees variables (calculated per employee, respec-
18The advantage of the cross–section analysis for this issue is discussed in section 4.3. The reason
are the data restrictions on historical ownership (share) information addressed in the data section.
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tively), are positive and significant at the 1%–level. They remain quite stable and sum
up to .65 which would denote decreasing returns to scale. The contribution of labor to
pre–tax profits is about four times higher than that of capital and an increase in the
cost per employee of 1% leads to a rise in pre–tax profits per employee of .5%. The
effect of the cost per employee variable can be better interpreted as a proxy for that
part of labor productivity which is reflected in pre–tax profits. Controlling for fixed
firm effects, we can explain up to 75.4% of the variation in profits before taxation.
[Table 3 here]
As a test of sensitivity and to compare the tax effect with the second robustness
check in subsection 4.3.2, we first regress each specification with the single statutory tax
rate separately. We find a strongly negative effect which is significant at the 1%–level.
However, more important, our coefficient estimate of the statutory tax rate difference to
the parent has the expected negative sign and is likewise highly significant, indicating
that affiliates with a lower tax rate relative to the parent location observe a higher
pre–tax profit per employee, and vice versa. This confirms our theoretical expectations
from Eq. (7) and, thus, gives indirect evidence for profit shifting activities. The size
of the tax difference effect slightly decreases with the inclusion of the macro controls
in column (4). Quantitatively, our most preferred specification (column (6) of Table
3) suggest an increase in pre–tax profits of 7.1% if the tax difference to the parent
decreases by 10 percentage points.
This semi–elasticity of −.71 is by about one fourth smaller as the analogous one
estimated in a recent study by Huizinga and Laeven (2008). They run cross–section
estimations for the year 1999, likewise with the AMADEUS database, and, with their
largest sample of 1, 218 observations, they find a coefficient estimate of the tax difference
to the parent of −.975. However, our panel regressions yielding the smaller coefficient
of −.71 simultaneously control for fixed effects at the firm level which is not feasible
in a cross–section analysis. For example, if high–profitable (low–profitable) affiliates,
e.g. due to more (less) efficient managers or engineers, are more often located in low–
tax (high–tax) countries (cf. Becker and Fuest, 2007), we capture these unobservable
affiliate characteristics by the fixed–effects approach and thus obtain a lower effect of
the profit shifting incentive, i.e. the tax differential.
In specification (5) and (6), we additionally control for the financial leverage ratio
of a subsidiary which results in a significant and large coefficient of −1.4. This is
not surprising as the balance sheet item Profit (Loss) before Taxation is minus all
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deductible costs which includes interest payments, in contrast to EBIT or EBITDA.
The coefficients of all other explanatory variables show no significant change and,
furthermore, stay statistically significant. However, the effect of the tax difference to
the parent slightly decreases with the inclusion of the leverage ratio. A smaller impact
of the incentive to shift profits (e.g. via classical transfer pricing manipulations) is
consistent if we assume larger leverage ratios in high–tax than in low–tax countries
(for the purpose of legally biasing the MNE’s different national tax bases, e.g. via
heightened debt financing of a high–tax affiliate).
To account for time–varying country effects, we include our set of macro control
variables. This inclusion raises the adjusted R2 value only a little. The coefficient of
GDP turns out significantly negative. An explanation could be that big markets are
characterized by a high degree of competition which results in a lower profitability.
The results further indicate that wealthier countries, measured by GDP per capita,
which thus possess the more advanced technologies, yield a more profitable production.
Moreover, a lower risk of a country, proxied by a higher level of the corruption index (i.e.
a lower degree of corruption), seems to impact pre–tax profits per employee positively.
4.3 Robustness checks
We firstly undertake some smaller sensitivity tests before we focus on two fundamental
robustness checks in subsections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. The results of these minor tests de-
scribed in the following two paragraphs are not presented in the paper but are available
from the author upon request.
At first, we check if our firm variables are robust against a variation in the method
of normalization. Instead of dividing by the number of employees, we alternatively
calculate our subsidiary variables in ratios of operating revenue and additionally in
ratios of total assets. Both of these modifications yield almost equal quantitative results
but a slightly smaller coefficient of the tax differential. However, a firm’s number of
employees is likely to be less influenced by tax rates than monetary values which makes
a division by the number of employees a more suitable way to control for subsidiary
size.19 Furthermore, instead of using the cost of employees as a proxy for the labor
input, we alternatively apply the number of employees as an explanatory firm variable.
Again, we find no significant change in any of our qualitative and quantitative results.
The possibility that some subsidiaries in our sample exhibit the same parent firm
19Moreover, without any normalization our quantitative results again do not change significantly.
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could potentially bias the standard errors or overestimate the effect of the tax differ-
ential. To test the relevance of this problem, we randomly deleted observations with
a duplicated subsidiary–parent–connection to exclusively keep firms with unique par-
ents in the sample. Hence, the sample reduces to 6, 925 subsidiaries, i.e. almost the
half of our affiliates are now dropped. However, with this reduced sample, all speci-
fications of Table 3 yield very similar quantitative results. The coefficient of the tax
differential turns out to be only slightly larger (−0.75) in our preferred specification
(6) of Table 3 and is again significant at the 1%–level. Furthermore, this quantitatively
almost equal effect of the tax difference to the parent with this reduced sample, com-
pered to our baseline estimations with the full sample, suggests that profits are shifted
mainly between the affiliate and the parent firm and not between the affiliate and other
subsidiaries of its parent.
4.3.1 Cross–section analysis
Due to the data restrictions of the historical ownership information mentioned de-
scribed in section 3, a fundamental qualitative sensitivity check of our results is to
additionally run our regressions from Table 3 in a cross–section. We do this with OLS
for the year 2004 as this is the last reported date in most cases of our database version.
The results are presented in Table 4 in the Appendix. In the cross–section regressions,
it is now feasible to include 59 industry dummy variables (NACE Rev.1 2–digit level).
However, with the cross–section analysis, we cannot control for fixed firm effects
which consequently results in higher coefficient estimates and in a small R2 value of
about .31, less than half of the value from the fixed–effects panel regressions of Table 3.
Though, all decisive coefficients still exhibit the expected sign and are highly significant.
In particular, the tax difference to the parent has a significantly negative effect on
a subsidiary’s pre–tax profits (−1.21 in column (6) of Table 4). This confirms our
(indirect) evidence of profit shifting and states that our qualitative results are robust
to a cross–section analysis. This in turn mitigates the concerns about the restricted
ownership information.
4.3.2 Domestic individual firms
Another fundamental robustness check to confirm our profit shifting inference is to
compare the tax rate elasticities of MNEs with those of purely domestic companies
(cf. Mintz and Smart, 2004). In such an analysis, we obviously have to revert to the
statutory tax rate as differentials to a foreign parent do not exist for Non–MNEs. With
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the AMADEUS database, we construct a separate sample of at maximum 114, 728
individual domestic firms with no shareholders and no subsidiaries to compare these
regressions with those done with our initial MNE–sample. For the purpose of a qualita-
tive robustness test, in this comparison, we focus on cross–section analysis for the year
2004 with OLS to get definite ownership information necessary for precisely separating
a multinational from a domestic company.20
The results are shown in Table 5 in the Appendix. With this sample of solely do-
mestic firms, we cannot find any significantly negative effect of the statutory tax rate,
in contrast to the regressions with our MNE–sample in Table 4. Moreover, although
insignificant (besides a weak significance in column (5)), the coefficient estimate of the
tax rate in Table 5 is positive. This underlines the relevance of the statutory tax rate
for companies with at least one connection to a foreign country via its parent firm
(MNEs) in explaining variations in pre–tax profits. This in turn supports our prior
profit shifting findings. In specifications (2), (4) and (6), we leave out GDP because of
a high correlation between the statutory tax rate and GDP (86%) which could result in
upwards biased standard errors of the respective coefficients and thus in insignificance
due to multicollinearity problems.
4.4 Parent’s ownership share and profit shifting
The theoretically stimulating effect of the parent’s ownership share of its subsidiary
on the level of shifting is described in section 2. An increase in the ownership share
leads to a boost in profit shifting activities via lower shifting costs as the feasibility of
implementing shifting strategies improves due to more management influence at the
subsidiary in general, or more share voting rights in particular (management effect).
To test this hypothesis from Eq. (6), we renew our initial MNE–sample requirement
of the parent’s minimum total ownership share of its foreign subsidiary of 90% (cf.
section 3) to a minimum direct ownership share requirement of 25%.21 All other criteria
from the baseline MNE–sample stay the same. Now, the average direct ownership
share is 92.9% with a standard deviation of 16.1 percentage points. To capture the
additional effect of the ownership share, we generate an interaction term between the
20See section 3 for a discussion on the ownership data restrictions.
21To precisely test our hypothesis from Eq. (6), we apply the parent’s direct ownership share instead
of the total share which is the sum of directly and indirectly held shares. In doing so, we assure that
no potentially opposed effects via the indirect holding of shares can emerge from other affiliates’
management interests.
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tax differential and the parent’s direct ownership share. Based on our hypothesis from
Eq. (6) in combination with our indirect approach of profit shifting evidence from Eq.
(7), we expect a negative coefficient of this interaction term to represent more shifting
via an additional impact of the tax differential on pre–tax profits for a higher ownership
share.
[Table 6 here]
The regression results of a cross–section analysis for the year 2004 with OLS are
shown in Table 6.22 Due to the large number of subsidiaries with a parent that
fully owns the affiliate (71.9% of the subsidiaries), the tax differential and the in-
teraction term between the tax differential and the parent’s direct ownership share
((TaxDiff.toParent)×(ParentShare)) are highly correlated (98.9%). This multicollinear-
ity is very likely to increase the standard errors of the estimated coefficients of the two
collinear variables which can result in insignificance (cf. columns (5) and (6) in Table
6). The interpretation of such an interaction effect is also not straightforward (cf. last
paragraph of this section). For this reason, to get a more clear–cut interpretation, we
calculate the interaction term by multiplying the tax differential with the deviation of
the ownership share from its mean (centering). The correlation between this interac-
tion term and the tax differential is at the moderate level of 13.0%. These results are
displayed in column (1)–(4) of Table 6.
Basically, the coefficient of the tax differential alone describes the effect of the tax
difference on pre–tax profits for an average ownership share of 92.9%. For an ownership
share above this mean, an increase in the tax differential has a stronger negative impact
on pre–tax profits than for ownership shares below 92.9%.23 Thus, an increase in the
ownership share, holding the tax differential fixed, strengthens profit shifting in the
sense that the sum of both coefficients decreases further. This qualitative result is
in line with the expectations from Eq. (6) and (7). In specification (2), a full set of
country dummy variables is included instead of the macro controls which results in
an increased significance of the interaction term coefficient (1%–level). The inclusion
of country dummies is feasible as the tax differential varies across subsidiaries. To
22The cross–section analysis for the year 2004 is again preferred to the fixed–effects panel study due
to the data restrictions on historical ownership (share) information addressed in section 3.
23This results as the coefficient of the interaction term multiplied with the respective (positive or
negative) deviation from the mean ownership share has to be added to the original coefficient of the
tax differential.
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conclude, our results provide (indirect) evidence that firms which are owned by their
parent with a higher ownership share are engaged in a higher level of profit shifting.
Note, that robust results can also be inferred without centering the ownership share
in the interaction term (see column (5) and (6) of Table 6). It is evident that with
this little modification all coefficients of regressions (5) and (6) are equal to the re-
spective results in the similar specifications (1) and (4), except for the tax differential.
As mentioned above, multicollinearity leads here to higher standard errors of the tax
differential’s coefficient estimates which strongly reduces the significance but leaves the
coefficients unbiased. Now, the coefficient of the tax differential alone generally repre-
sents the effect of the tax difference on pre–tax profits for an ownership share of zero.
Thus, with an increasing ownership share the total effect of the tax differential (the
sum of both coefficients) decreases, and gets negative at an ownership share of 59.0%
(for regression (6)). Above this share, the effect of the tax differential on pre–tax profits
is negative. Focusing on this group, a further increase in the ownership share, holding
the tax differential fixed, intensifies profit shifting in the sense that the sum of both
coefficients decreases further.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides indirect evidence of profit shifting activities by multinational en-
terprises (MNEs) within the EU–25 applying a panel analysis with the European micro
database AMADEUS. In addition, our estimations show that a higher parent’s owner-
ship share of its subsidiary leads to an increase in the level of shifting activities between
these two affiliates, and vice versa. Robust empirical evidence for this positive impact
of the ownership share on the intensity of shifting is scarce in the existing literature.
We incorporate this ownership effect of enhanced or reduced shifting possibilities, re-
spectively, in a well–established simple theoretical model of profit shifting. The main
hypotheses for our econometric specifications are derived from this short model.
For identifying profit shifting behavior, we explain variations in pre–tax profitability
of profit–making multinational subsidiaries located in the EU–25 with the statutory tax
rate difference of these affiliates to their respective foreign parent firms, while control-
ling for a range of firm and country variables. We apply a panel analysis for the years
1995 to 2005 with OLS fixed–effects estimations controlling for unobservable subsidiary
characteristics. Our regressions indicate a highly significant negative impact of the tax
differential on profits before taxation which is consistent with profit shifting behavior.
18
Quantitatively, the results suggest an increase in a subsidiary’s pre–tax profitability of
7.1% if the statutory tax rate difference (between the subsidiary and its foreign parent
firm) decreases by 10 percentage points, and vice versa. Several fundamental robustness
checks confirm our profit shifting inference, e.g. a comparison of the tax rate effects of
MNEs with those of domestic individual companies.
A precise comparison of semi–elasticities of different empirical studies is complicated
in most cases as the data structure and the methodology, specially with respect to
the tax measure for identifying shifting activities, varies in the literature. However, in
comparison to the overall empirical literature using US data, our results suggest that
the suspicion of more intensive profit shifting in Europe than in the US, due to large
tax rate differences and the mostly employed exemption system within the EU, cannot
be confirmed. Even though e.g. Grubert and Mutti (1991) or Hines and Rice (1994)
apply cross–section estimations without the feasibility to control for unobserved fixed
firm effects which generally might yield overestimated tax effects, their calculated semi–
elasticities of reported profits with respect to the statutory tax rate are still very large
(−6.3 in the case of Hines and Rice, 1994; cf. our respective result of −1.7 in column
(5) of Table 3). Furthermore, our semi–elasticity with respect to the tax differential
of −.71 is by about one fourth smaller as the analogous one estimated in a recent
study by Huizinga and Laeven (2008) who likewise undertake a cross–section analysis.
If higher profitable affiliates, e.g. due to a better management, are more often located
in a low–tax country (Becker and Fuest, 2007), we capture this unobservable affiliate
characteristic by the fixed–effects approach and thus obtain a lower effect of the profit
shifting incentive on pre–tax profitability.
However, the robust empirical results of our paper indicate a statistically as well as
economically significant effect of corporate taxes on the location of profit. More pre-
cisely, the allocation of gross profits is distorted by the statutory tax rate differential
to the parent firm. Therefore, the shifting of profits from high–tax to low–tax countries
seems to be relevant and can result in a substantial bias of national tax revenues in
Europe. Hence, in the light of our results, concerning the advantage of abolishing trans-
fer pricing problems, there is an argument for the European Commission’s proposed
changeover from the current EU corporate tax principle of separate accounting to a
system of formula apportionment which substantially reduces the incentives for profit
shifting activities.
With respect to the estimated positive ownership effect on the shifting intensity,
under the principle of separate accounting, one policy implication for the tax audit by
national fiscal authorities might be to condition the investigation intensity of MNEs’
19
intra–company transactions with foreign affiliates on the level of the respective share-
holding. Due to the time intensive and complex assessment of transfer pricing docu-
mentations this selection could improve the efficiency of the auditing.
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6 Appendix
Table 1: Country Statistics
Country Subsidiaries Share
Austria 146 1.04%
Belgium 1,058 7.52%
Czech Republic 396 2.81%
Denmark 844 6.00%
Estonia 206 1.46%
Finland 472 3.35%
France 1,731 12.30%
Germany 1,046 7.43%
Great Britain 2,610 18.54%
Greece 60 0.43%
Hungary 30 0.21%
Ireland 480 3.41%
Italy 877 6.23%
Latvia 6 0.04%
Lithuania 33 0.23%
Luxembourg 20 0.14%
Netherlands 1,036 7.36%
Poland 643 4.57%
Portugal 84 0.60%
Slovakia 60 0.43%
Slovenia 7 0.05%
Spain 1,390 9.87%
Sweden 842 5.98%
Sum 14,077 100.00%
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Subsidiary Level:
Profit before TaxationF 67,804 7,399 76,644 1 8,055,052
Fixed AssetsF 67,804 41,933 473,442 1 3.76e+07
Cost of EmployeesF 67,804 9,540 42,387 1 2,746,471
Number of Employees 67,804 211.0 887.3 1 62,784
Operating RevenueF 64,904 93,403 466,587 1 2.10e+07
Financial Leverage Ratio 62,355 .6230 .2335 0 1
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 67,804 .3337 .0549 .1 .5676
Tax Difference to ParentN 66,045 -.018 .089 -.4676 .432
Parent Level:
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 66,045 .3519 .077 0 .5676
Country Level:
GDPH 67,634 1,016 692.9 5.54 2,792
GDP per CapitaJ 67,634 108.0 17.37 35.4 222.4
Unemployment Rate 67,634 8.18 3.4 2.1 19.9
Corruption IndexI 67,634 7.46 1.66 2.99 10
Notes:
F In thousand US dollars, current prices.
 = (total liabilities / total assets).
N = (subsidiary statutory corporate tax rate – parent statutory corporate tax rate).
H In billion US dollars, current prices.
J In Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), EU–25 = 100.
I Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International (TI), ranks from 0
(extrem level of corruption) to 10 (free of corruption).
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Table 3: Baseline Estimation – Profit Shifting Evidence
OLS Fixed–Effects, Panel 1995–2005
Dependent Variable: Log Profit before Taxation (per Employee)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Fixed Assets .1191∗∗∗ .1169∗∗∗ .1180∗∗∗ .1155∗∗∗ .1350∗∗∗ .1329∗∗∗
(per Employee) (.0103) (.0105) (.0104) (.0105) (.0105) (.0106)
Log Cost of Employees .5079∗∗∗ .5050∗∗∗ .5105∗∗∗ .5089∗∗∗ .5186∗∗∗ .5166∗∗∗
(per Employee) (.0208) (.0212) (.0209) (.0213) (.0224) (.0227)
Financial Leverage Ratio -1.354∗∗∗ -1.355∗∗∗
(.0502) (.0511)
Statutory Tax Rate -1.757∗∗∗ -1.891∗∗∗ -1.703∗∗∗
(.2673) (.2696) (.2714)
Tax Difference to Parent -.7504∗∗∗ -.7347∗∗∗ -.7147∗∗∗
(.1570) (.1570) (.1570)
Log GDP -.5062∗∗∗ -.4388∗∗∗ -.6878∗∗∗ -.6136∗∗∗
(.1172) (.1190) (.1210) (.1228)
Log GDP per Capita 1.150∗∗∗ .8751∗∗∗ .8846∗∗∗ .6155∗∗∗
(.2404) (.2446) (.2390) (.2428)
Log Unemployment Rate .0818 .1500∗∗∗ .0838 .1432∗∗∗
(.0555) (.0558) (.0572) (.0575)
Log Corruption Index .2012∗∗∗ .2282∗∗∗ .3090∗∗∗ .3431∗∗∗
(.0690) (.0699) (.0696) (.0705)
Year Dummy Variables
√ √ √ √ √ √
Number of Observations 67,804 66,045 67,634 65,877 62,355 60,783
Number of Firms 14,077 13,741 14,067 13,731 13,515 13,198
Adjusted R2 .7369 .7371 .7374 .7376 .7535 .7539
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit–
making multinational subsidiaries that exhibit a foreign parent which owns at least 90% of the
ownership shares. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm (Log) of the subsidiary’s
unconsolidated pre–tax profit calculated per employee. An OLS model with fixed effects is
estimated. Tax Difference to Parent is defined as the statutory corporate tax rate of the con-
sidered subsidiary minus the tax rate of the subsidiary‘s parent. All regressions include year
dummies. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables regression equivalent
to the fixed–effects model.
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Table 4: Robustness Check 1 – Cross–Section Analysis
OLS, Cross–Section 2004
Dependent Variable: Log Profit before Taxation (per Employee)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Fixed Assets .2843∗∗∗ .2831∗∗∗ .2857∗∗∗ .2856∗∗∗ .2702∗∗∗ .2690∗∗∗
(per Employee) (.0353) (.0352) (.0350) (.0341) (.0295) (.0294)
Log Cost of Employees .6238∗∗∗ .5940∗∗∗ .6377∗∗∗ .6412∗∗∗ .6421∗∗∗ .6453∗∗∗
(per Employee) (.0529) (.0505) (.0595) (.0633) (.0654) (.0688)
Financial Leverage Ratio -1.400∗∗∗ -1.411∗∗∗
(.1794) (.1704)
Statutory Tax Rate -3.324∗∗∗ -2.713∗∗∗ -2.281∗∗
(.7391) (.9686) (1.057)
Tax Difference to Parent -2.113∗∗∗ -1.551∗∗∗ -1.210∗∗∗
(.4170) (.3009) (.2757)
Log GDP .0410 .0288 .0409 .0306
(.0280) (.0280) (.0306) (.0314)
Log GDP per Capita -.4436 -.8072∗∗∗ -.1054 -.4305∗
(.3070) (.2180) (.3058) (.2329)
Log Unemployment Rate -.1299 -.2252∗ -.0516 -.1332
(.1186) (.1148) (.1225) (.1276)
Log Corruption Index .0536 .1940 -.2006 -.0734
(.1624) (.1389) (.1962) (.1650)
Industry Dummy Variables
√ √ √ √ √ √
Number of Observations 9,305 9,104 9,305 9,104 8,589 8,412
R2 .2611 .2619 .2621 .2641 .3087 .3107
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for country clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit–
making multinational subsidiaries that exhibit a foreign parent which owns at least 90% of the
ownership shares. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm (Log) of the subsidiary’s
unconsolidated pre–tax profit calculated per employee. An OLS model is estimated. Tax
Difference to Parent is defined as the statutory corporate tax rate of the considered subsidiary
minus the tax rate of the subsidiary‘s parent. All regressions include 59 industry dummies
(NACE Rev.1 2–digit level).
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Table 5: Robustness Check 2 – Domestic Individual Firms
OLS, Cross–Section 2004
Dependent Variable: Log Profit before Taxation (per Employee)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Fixed Assets .3287∗∗∗ .3295∗∗∗ .2885∗∗∗ .2893∗∗∗ .2589∗∗∗ .2603∗∗∗
(per Employee) (.0449) (.0446) (.0191) (.0189) (.0193) (.0193)
Log Cost of Employees .8427∗∗∗ .8408∗∗∗ .8044∗∗∗ .8027∗∗∗ .7944∗∗∗ .7916∗∗∗
(per Employee) (.0394) (.0389) (.0325) (.0325) (.0416) (.0411)
Financial Leverage Ratio -1.612∗∗∗ -1.608∗∗∗
(.2233) (.2236)
Statutory Tax Rate 1.194 .6454 .8664 .4431 2.501∗ 1.756
(1.096) (.9032) (1.320) (1.231) (1.396) (1.466)
Log GDP -.0603 -.0472 -.0803
(.0523) (.0552) (.0633)
Log GDP per Capita -.9961∗∗∗ -1.297∗∗∗ -.7235∗ -.9614∗∗∗ -.0403 -.4449
(.3138) (.2820) (.3732) (.3245) (.5081) (.4333)
Log Unemployment Rate -.6095∗∗∗ -.7463∗∗∗ -.6471∗∗∗ -.7541∗∗∗ -.5514∗∗ -.7322∗∗∗
(.1462) (.1831) (.1473) (.1784) (.2068) (.2008)
Log Corruption Index .3516∗∗∗ .4272∗∗∗ .1532 .2143 -.2670 -.1630
(.1188) (.1276) (.1971) (.2034) (.2115) (.2293)
Industry Dummy Variables
√ √ √ √
Number of Observations 114,728 114,728 114,728 114,728 108,646 108,646
R2 .2987 .2985 .3462 .3460 .3871 .3867
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for country clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit–
making domestic individual firms with no shareholders and no subsidiaries. The dependent
variable is the natural logarithm (Log) of a firms’s unconsolidated pre–tax profit calculated
per employee. An OLS model is estimated. 59 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2–digit level)
are includes where indicated. The correlation between Statutory Tax Rate and Log GDP is
86.2% which could result in larger standard errors and thus in an upwards biased P–value
due to multicollinearity problems; therefore, in specification (2), (4), and (6), we leave Log
GDP out.
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Table 6: Parent’s Ownership Share and Profit Shifting
OLS, Cross–Section 2004
Dependent Variable: Log Profit before Taxation (per Employee)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Fixed Assets .2665∗∗∗ .2661∗∗∗ .2739∗∗∗ .2493∗∗∗ .2665∗∗∗ .2493∗∗∗
(per Employee) (.0264) (.0259) (.0315) (.0261) (.0264) (.0261)
Log Cost of Employees .7930∗∗∗ .8088∗∗∗ .6593∗∗∗ .6541∗∗∗ .7930∗∗∗ .6541∗∗∗
(per Employee) (.0690) (.0747) (.0645) (.0679) (.0690) (.0679)
Financial Leverage Ratio -1.477∗∗∗ -1.477∗∗∗
(.1840) (.1840)
Tax Difference to Parent -1.334∗∗∗ -.8475∗∗∗ -1.516∗∗∗ -1.111∗∗∗ 1.480 1.950
(.3780) (.2365) (.3222) (.3208) (1.168) (1.494)
(TaxDiff.toParent)×(Parent -3.031∗∗ -3.570∗∗∗ -3.046∗∗ -3.306∗∗
Share–MeanParentShare) (1.253) (1.264) (1.157) (1.517)
(TaxDiff.toParent)× -3.031∗∗ -3.306∗∗
(ParentShare) (1.253) (1.517)
Parent Share .0375 -.1187 .0540 .1075 .0375 .1075
(.1020) (.1058) (.1054) (.0958) (.1020) (.0958)
Log GDP .0184 .0301 .0262 .0184 .0262
(.0402) (.0364) (.0380) (.0402) (.0380)
Log GDP per Capita -.9381∗∗∗ -.6978∗∗ -.2060 -.9381∗∗∗ -.2060
(.3317) (.3122) (.3246) (.3317) (.3246)
Log Unemployment Rate -.3654∗∗ -.3640∗∗∗ -.2652∗ -.3654∗∗ -.2652∗
(.1343) (.1180) (.1361) (.1343) (.1361)
Log Corruption Index .0880 -.0705 -.3843∗∗ .0880 -.3843∗∗
(.1754) (.1647) (.1816) (.1754) (.1816)
Industry Dummy Variables
√ √ √
Country Dummy Variables
√
Number of Observations 8,815 8,815 8,815 8,107 8,815 8,107
R2 .2254 .2326 .2674 .3176 .2254 .3176
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for country clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit–
making multinational subsidiaries that exhibit a foreign parent which owns at least 25% of
the direct ownership shares. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm (Log) of the sub-
sidiary’s unconsolidated pre–tax profit calculated per employee. An OLS model is estimated.
Tax Difference to Parent is defined as the statutory corporate tax rate of the considered
subsidiary minus the tax rate of the subsidiary‘s parent. (TaxDiff.toParent)×(ParentShare–
MeanParentShare) is the interaction term between the statutory corporate tax rate dif-
ference to the parent and the deviation of the parent’s direct ownership share from
its mean (correlation between this interaction term and the tax differential is 13.0%).
(TaxDiff.toParent)×(ParentShare) is the interaction between the tax differential and the
parent’s direct ownership share (correlation between this term and the tax differential is
98.9%). Parent Share is the parent’s direct ownership share in the considered subsidiary. 59
industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2–digit level) are includes where indicated. In specification
(2), a full set of country dummies is included instead of the macro controls.
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